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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper presents a ready-to-use security assessment 
framework for wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The 
parameters in the proposed security assessment framework 
perform independent security assessment of WSNs and of 
their applications. Our proposed framework uses actual 
responses of the entities (such as nodes, communication link 
and network response) to assign numerical values for 
security assessment of WSNs. The method for calculating 
the optimal values for each security parameter of the 
framework is also discussed. Our proposed framework is 
designed to avoid unwanted impacts of the complexities of 
security algorithms, communication protocols and strong 
cryptography. Usually, the complexity of algorithms 
disguises the actual assessment of the WSN, but the 
independence of the proposed framework from these 
security-disguising objects makes this framework better than 
other assessment frameworks in terms of scalability. 
Keywords – Wireless Sensor Network, WSN 
Security, Security Assessment Framework, 
Numerical Security Assessment 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the past, security was not conceived of as a core issue 
during the development stages of various infrastructures. 
This is particularly so with the Internet. Once structures are 
established, it is often more difficult to integrate security 
than embedding security features at an early stage. It is 
common for security-related issues to become more 
complex in networking infrastructures because of massively 
increased number of assets  in a shared environment of 
resources. Security specialists suggest that the security 
should be embedded at the start of the infrastructure 
development [1] [2]. Among other networks, the wireless 
sensor network (WSN) contains various self-organizing 
sensors that form a distributed, flexible network. Being 
without a fixed topology and distributed, the WSN becomes 
insecure and more vulnerable to attacks [3] [4]. 
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WSN is a security-fragile network and, in most applications, 
the use of acquired data is very significant, e.g. military 
monitoring, disaster recovery, bio-weapons, and emission of 
poisonous gases. Though the vulnerability issue is being 
addressed by research communities, there is also a rising 
demand for finding new security strategies [5] [6] [7]. In 
order to use these security-fragile networks for different 
applications in the real world, a more comprehensive, 
reliable, efficient and less complex security strategy needs 
to be developed. 
The benefits of introducing new security strategies for 
networking are twofold. One is the protection of the existing 
assets of the current WSN and competitors’ network 
technology, and the other is to help to mature the WSNs and 
Next Generation Networks [7] [8]. This need is more 
important than ever because of the popularity of short-life 
ad hoc networks. On the other hand, the security 
requirement of the WSN application needs to be assessed, 
too. Different security assessment frameworks serve 
theoretical or rule-based assessment of real world 
applications [8] [13], but fail to apply these rules to specific 
types of network. 
In this paper, security assessment is addressed by a new 
approach of numerical assessment. We identify the general 
causes of assessment failure of WSNs by other security 
frameworks, and propose a new approach that is 
independent of assessment, and is more scalable. The design 
of the framework and its parameters are first introduced, 
followed by an analytical and mathematical representation 
for evaluating the security level of a WSN. Our future 
research will look at the greater flexibility in implementing 
our proposed Security Assessment Framework (SAFE) in 
different real environments. 
 
2 SECURITY ISSUES IN WSNs 
 
It is a general observation that key requirements of security 
and privacy (including authenticity, data access, and 
confidentiality) vary from one application to another. 
Likewise, the security features of a WSN vary depending 
upon the entities involved (protocols, cryptographic key 
distribution and management, etc.) in communication 
among sensors. It appears impossible to design the same 
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time, the problem gets worse if the infrastructure is 
deployed without appropriate security assessment of the 
WSN, and of the application as well. Therefore, the use of a 
WSN in different applications becomes difficult [9]. This 
suggests that the security features of a WSN should properly 
address the security requirements of each application 
separately. 
This leads us to believe that the selection of an 
appropriate WSN for different applications requires the best 
possible security assessment of the WSN, and of the 
application that intends to employ that WSN. Our 
motivation is the fact that, in spite of the advances in 
networks, security parameters and security tools, the desired 
assessment technique does not yet exist, at least in the WSN 
[10] [11] [12]. The challenge is to analyze and assess the 
security features (of the WSN), and the security 
requirements (of the application) in order to deploy secure 
WSN-based applications. 
 
3 LITERATURE SURVEY 
 
A few rule-based security assessment frameworks are 
available [10] [13] [14]. These assessment frameworks do 
not address the required appropriate assessment of security 
for both the WNS and the application [10] [14]. These 
established assessment frameworks are no more than 
process/rule-based models for implementing any security 
plan/framework. They follow a list of precautions and 
recommend the maintenance of a log of logs [12] [13] [14]. 
Various factors cause these rule-based/ theoretical security 
assessment frameworks to fail, especially in WSNs. These 
factors include the complex security algorithms, higher-bit 
encryption, hard-coded communication protocols, open 
system architectures, hybrid network models, and network 
deployment strategies [15] [16] [17] [18]. Some of these are 
elaborated below. 
– Encryption: A few network experts observe that WSN 
security is hidden in developing new and complex 
encrypting schemes [14]. Probably they prefer an individual 
security concept model for mobile and ad hoc networks. 
More complex issues occur when experts deal with key 
interchange, distribution and management of these highly 
complex encrypting schemes over unreliable 
communication layers of WSN models. They then return to 
their previous energy efficient encryption schemes. (For 
example, when the energy issue was found to be a bigger 
challenge, experts changed their interest to developing smart 
codes) [12] [15]. 
– Complex algorithms: Highly complex and unbreakable 
encryption algorithms from ECC, AES, RAS, and others 
(employing 64, 128, 256, 1024, and 2048 bits) have been 
developed and the quest is continuing [12] [18]. Even today, 
encryption is neither conceived of, nor treated as, the final 
word for WSN security. We believe that a higher number of 
bits will never guarantee a permanent solution, as is clear 
from the history of encryption. An alternative to the call for 
higher bits is given by smart ECC: Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography. Higher bit supporters do not agree that, since 
the most powerful supercomputers would take thousands of 
years to break ECC or AES encryption, then the fear of 
insecurity should diminish. The cost of computation and the 
interlinked communication layers of the WSN will always 
act as a constraint on complex algorithms. 
– Open systems: Another group seeks an open system 
security solution for WSNs as the ultimate approach [13]. 
Customization of security solutions gives security comfort 
at a personal level, but it offers a lower degree of 
interoperability among deployed security components/ 
services, it brings non-synchronization of network tools, and 
it delays updates among different types of interlinked 
WSNs. The lack of computation power in non-intelligent 
nodes become key constraints on open system 
implementation, since child sensor nodes are not designed to 
make crucial decisions. 
– Hybrid models: Like other networks, sensor networks are 
mobile, ad hoc and sometimes disparate hybrid models [16]. 
In these models, the trust domain among sensor nodes can 
be rare or highly complex to achieve. 
– Sensor deployment: The random deployment of wireless 
sensors by an airplane, in an enemy or mountainous area, for 
real-time disaster detection and recovery operations, is also 
an issue. There are other questions that cannot be 
numerically answered by these rule-based or theoretical 
frameworks. Such questions are: How strong is the security 
of a network when it is simulated? What are the network 
security requirements of the application? How strong is the 
security of a network when it is deployed? What is the 
security status after full deployment? What are the effects 
after any new security patch/updates? What is the overall 
security strength after updates? What are the measurable 
assessment analysis components? What is the segmented 
strength of the WSN after breakdowns? What is the security 
status of the network after buying solution ‘A’ instead of 
‘B’, and vice versa? Existing frameworks require dozens of 
pages and several disks for archiving logs to answer these 
questions. 
 
4 OUR PROPOSED SECURITY ASSESSMENT 
FRAMEWORK 
 
To address security-related issues in network assessment, 
we propose a new framework. Our framework is unique 
within existing, rule-based, security assessment strategies 
[16] [17] [18]. It enables the security quantification of both 
the WSN and the application to be performed. The proposed 
framework determines numeric values for the security 
requirements (of the application), and security features (of 
the WSN). These values are used to evaluate the security 
strength of both the WNS and the application. Another use 
of this value is to label the level the security such as ‘low’, 
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to set limits for these security levels. Refer to the Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Proposed security assessment framework 
 
5 STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
 
The proposed framework is distributed in four segments. 
Each segment has a different number of customized 
parameters (Figure 1) to determine the security 
requirements. These security requirements are then used to 
match the core security features [8]. 
The values of each parameter range from 0.0 to 1.0. The 
value is calculated using different mathematical methods 
(Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Allocation of Values in the Security Assessment 
Framework 
Segment Parameter  Name  Score Method 
Network  Priority queuing  0<x<1  0.2 (signed) 
Network Absolute  recovery  0<x<1 SR/RR 
Sink Penetration  level  0<x<1  SL–(CL/SL) 
Link  Response to attack  0 or 1  Binary value 
Node Assets  Identification  0<x<1  (TN–CN)/TN 
Node  Exposure investigation  0<x<1  N nodes/sq. Unit 
 
Network segment 
 
Network segment is the first segment of the proposed 
framework. It has two security assessment parameters 
(Priority Queuing and Absolute Recovery) whose values 
give the information about other parameters for any WSN or 
application. 
 
– Priority Queuing (PQ): PQ represents the status of 
disruption or destruction of any other parameter in the 
framework. It indicates a negative impact if the value of any 
other parameter reaches the variance limit in a certain time 
frame. In addition, such a parameter is listed as vulnerable 
and moved to the top of a priority list to be maintained for 
this purpose. This priority list is used to identify 
vulnerabilities as well as to address the vulnerability of the 
WSN. 
Determining PQ: If the variance of any parameter, except 
the prioritization parameter, is observed to be greater than a 
given threshold, then that parameter is included in the 
priority list. Each of the entries listed reduces the WSN 
security by 0.2. The default value of the prioritization 
parameter is 1.0 in our framework; thus each decrement 
increases the vulnerability of the WSN. The variance value 
of 5 is observed in our test environment. The threshold of 
variance will vary depending on the type of WSN or WSN 
application. 
 
– Absolute Recovery (AR): AR represents the recovery 
status of the WSN from any existing threat. It depends on 
the number of recovery requests and successful recoveries 
from attacks on the WSN. 
Determining AR: The value of the parameter is calculated 
as the ratio of the number of successful recoveries to 
number of requests made for such recoveries. The default 
value of this parameter is 1.0. It is achieved by assuming all 
requests are recovered. The zero (0.0) value indicates that 
there are a negligible number of successful recoveries 
against the recovery requests and the WSN is vulnerable. 
The number is rounded off to one decimal place (Equation 
1). 
 
RR
SR
AR =  (1) 
where,  AR is Absolute Recovery 
  SR is number of Successful Recoveries 
  RR is number of Requests for Recoveries 
 
Sink Segment 
 
This segment contains one security assessment parameter 
(Penetration Level) whose values help determine the 
intensity of the damage to a WSN or an application. 
 
– Penetration Level (PL): PL represents the strength of the 
host WSN or application to resist the damage occurring in 
any segment (Network, Sink, Link and Node) against the 
security layers. The security layers include encryption, 
password authentication, establishment of trust domain, 
certificate exchange, and sender verification. 
Determining PL: For the reliability in the assessment 
procedure, we determine two values to calculate the PL 
parameter. These values are calculated for available security 
layers in the WSN or application. 
One value (Secure Layer) is calculated as optimal value 
of the parameter. It is achieved by simulating the WSN in 
favourable conditions in a test environment. The other value 
(Compromising Layer) represents the number of secure 
layers that compromise the security of the WSN. The value 
is achieved by simulating the WSN in a real environment. 
 
Assume an application-specific WSN. It is deployed with 
n secure layers, such that n  ≥ 2. If m threats (m is 
application-specific) pass through some security layers then 
those layers are called compromising layers. PL is now 
calculated, rounding as before (Equation 2). 
Network segment 
Sink segment 
Link segment 
Node segment 
Priority Queuing 
Absolute Recovery 
Penetration Level 
Response to Attack 
Assets Identification 
Exposure Investigation 
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SL
CL
SL PL − =  (2) 
where  PL is Level of threat/attack Penetration 
  SL is number of Secure Layers 
  CL is number of Compromising Layers 
 
Link Segment 
 
This segment of our framework contains one security 
assessment parameter (Response to Attacks). It gives a 
binary value of effectiveness of the defence of the WSN to 
some instance. 
 
– Response to Attacks (R2A): Usually, this parameter is 
important in those WSNs that have the support of a 
resource- rich and strongly defensive base node. It is zero in 
WSNs that are deployed purely on a temporary basis. 
Determining R2A: This parameter is calculated across 
two time frames. The two instants are i) upon detection of 
an attack (resource node makes sure of attack), and ii) upon 
generating any sort of reaction by that node. If all attacks 
that are detected at time (T0) are responded to by time (T1) 
by the defence of WSN, then the parameter’s score is 1. If 
any attack is not responded to within the time set by the 
WSN designer, then the parameter’s score is 0. 
 
Node Segment 
 
This segment comprises two security assessment parameters 
(Assets Identification, and Exposure Investigation). It gives 
information about possession and assurance of node-to-node 
point communication. 
 
– Assets Identification (AID): This parameter identifies the 
wireless sensor nodes that are cooperative. In ad hoc 
networks, every signed (secure) transmission adds value to 
the asset of the factor. Each node is allowed to communicate 
towards the immediate head node of that group only. 
Therefore, the number of reliable nodes is reported to the 
head of the each group. Similarly, information is passed to 
the sink that is considered as wireless sensor nodes. 
Determining AID: In a network of 100 nodes (TN) the 
value of the parameter is 1 if all nodes respond as assets, i.e. 
all these nodes meet all security steps implanted in the WSN 
and WSN application. The AID is calculated as shown 
below (Equation 3). 
 
TN
CN TN
AID
−
=  (3) 
where  AID is Assets Identification 
  TN is total number of Communication Nodes 
  CN is number of Compromising Nodes 
 
– Exposure Investigation (EI): The child leaves (sensor 
nodes) are inward-facing components of a WSN. EI 
determines how much exposure is being considered as direct 
exposure to the world. There can be some secret 
agents/nodes in a futuristic WSN model to spy on nodes of 
one’s own WSN). To count only their participation in the 
security assessment our framework does not assume an 
intermediary sink as a node. Ignoring these sinks keeps this 
parameter independent of the asset identification parameter. 
Determining EI: Suppose n nodes per square-unit 
(according to the requirement of the application) are placed 
in a WSN or subgroup/cluster of a WSN. Each node 
communicates across a range of a few metres. If one node is 
a sink, and 19 are children, then the Exposure Investigation 
has the value 1 for the WSN or subgroup/cluster of this 
WSN. The recommendations for the number of 
communicating sensors nodes in that area must be 
standardized first by reviewing the potential of the WSN 
and requirement of the WSN application. 
 
6 PLAN FOR REAL WORLD EVALUATION OF THE 
FRAMEWORK 
 
An example of one test result is shown below. 
 
Figure 2. An example of discrete values in our proposed 
framework 
 
As an extension to the present work, we are implementing 
our proposed security assessment framework (SAFE) in 
different real environments, e.g. military operations, disaster 
recovery in earthquake areas, and in flood disaster areas. We 
shall then compare these results with various organizations 
to determine the security level of WSN in different WSN 
applications. 
Calculating the discrete security value: 
Step 1 (Add): –0.4 + 0.5 + 0.6 + 1.0 + 0.7 + 0.6 = 3.0 
Step 2 (Div): 3.0 / (# of participating parameters i.e. 
5) 
Network seg 
Sink seg 
Link seg 
Node seg 
Priority Queuing 
Absolute Recovery 
Penetration Level 
Response to Attack 
Assets Identification 
Exposure Investigation 
0.4
0.5
0.6
1.0
0.7
0.6
0008587 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we identified the reasons why security 
assessment carried out by existing frameworks fails, 
particularly in WSNs and their applications. From this, we 
proposed a new framework for the security assessment of a 
WSN and its applications. 
The proposed framework is implemented by allocating 
numeric values to the security requirements of the WSN 
application. Similarly, it quantifies the security features of a 
WSN. 
We observe that the parameters and their values are 
independent of complex processes of cryptography. The 
method avoids any assessment impact due to the complex 
security algorithms of WSN. Further, we discussed the 
parameters of the proposed framework analytically and 
presented the basic mathematical operations to calculate 
them. The five indicated parameters of the framework 
collaborate to provide a final value as a net assessment. This 
single value represents the level or strength of the security 
made available by a WSN. The value of security is assumed 
by our proposed framework to range from 0.0 to 1.0. 
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